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ABSTRACT 
Better leverage of public funding is essential in order to trigger the invest-
ment needed for energy efficiency. In times of austerity governments in-
creasingly look at policy instruments not funded by public expenditure and 
Energy Savings Obligations represent one option. Because Energy Savings 
Obligations are paid for by all energy customers, the degree to which they 
are able to raise additional private capital for energy efficiency invest-
ments is crucial with regard to the financial burden on consumers. In this 
paper, we systematically assess how successful Energy Savings Obliga-
tions were in levering capital from parties other than the obligated entities 
including private investors and other public bodies. We analyse three 
countries with substantial experience with Energy Savings Obligations, 
identify the main design differences and the effect this has on the degree of 
leverage. We conclude that the design of Energy Savings Obligations 
largely determines the degree of leverage and that that there appears to be 
a trade-off between high leverage and additionality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Energy Savings Obligation (ESOs) are a prominent policy instrument for increasing the 
energy efficiency of the economy - they have been successfully implemented in a grow-
ing number of countries all over the world. Within the US, 34 states have implemented 
different variations of ESOs and 6 EU member states now have on-going ESOs. Also 
Australia has significant experience with the policy instrument (RAP 2012). The sys-
tems differ very much in design, often a result of different regulatory frameworks. In 
this paper, we will focus on the European ESOs. 
ESOs already featured in the EU Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy Services Di-
rective of 2006 (2006/32/EC) as a possible market-based instrument for realising energy 
savings. However, the Directive only recommended ESOs and there was no requirement 
for member states to implement the instrument. This has now changed: The new Energy 
Efficiency Directive of 2012 (2012/27/EU) includes a requirement in Article 7 that all 
member states must introduce ESOs. Exemptions from this obligation can be made if 
member states provide verification of equivalent savings resulting from alternative in-
struments. So far, the UK, Italy, France, Denmark, the Flanders region, and Poland have 
introduced ESOs, although in very different forms. Slovenia is about to implement them 
(Bertoldi 2010). 
One reason for the increasing prominence of ESOs is that they are widely considered as 
an option of using public funding sources (either paid by the taxpayer or via energy 
bills) to lever private capital at a time of constrained public budgets (Eichhammer 
2012). This leverage effect describes the ratio of public funding to private (and in some 
cases other public) capital. In a scheme that obliges profit-oriented organisations such as 
energy companies to deliver a certain amount of energy savings it can be expected that 
the obligated parties utilise approaches with high leverage effects to minimise their cost. 
Achieving high leverage rates with public funds can be considered the Gordian knot of 
leverage in policy design. 
However, so far no comprehensive analysis exists that compares different ESOs con-
cerning the amount of leverage they create. In this paper, we systematically review three 
prominent ESOs, namely the UK, France, and Denmark, and compare their results in 
terms of leverage. The restriction of the paper to the three cases is a result of data avail-
ability - in some cases evaluations exist, but those are not available to the public. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: First, we analyze different cost allocation paths 
within the obligation schemes. Second, we define what we mean by leverage and how it 
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applies to ESOs. Third, we provide background information on how ESOs work in gen-
eral and more specifically in the three countries under investigation. Fourth, we calcu-
late and compare the degree of leverage achieved in the three countries. Finally, we 
summarise the findings from the different countries and draw conclusions regarding the 
impact of design differences on leverage. 
 
2. COST ALLOCATION 
One common aspect of obligation schemes and other policy instruments is that most 
schemes do not subsidise the energy efficiency investment by 100 percent and a remain-
ing share of the investment has to be covered by other capital sources. The interest and 
repayment should be covered by the reduced energy costs resulting from the energy 
savings. Depending on the investor’s financial situation, the capital may come from 
own capital sources (e.g. personal savings) or may be refinanced by a commercial bank. 
Thus, the measures themselves are also financed by the same target group as they are 
implemented by energy consumers. So the main question of cost allocation is how the 
money is shifted between the different consumers and how the other actors contribute to 
this mechanism1.  
Within the figures below, the capital flows between the actors are shown. Costs that are 
not refinanced by another actor, such as administrative costs of the investors, are not 
shown in the graphs. Figure 1 shows the cost allocation paths within ESOs. The differ-
ent actors with their corresponding costs are shown and the cost allocation paths are 
indicated by arrows (whereas the direction of the arrow indicates the flow of capital). 
                                                 
 
1
 For a more detailed description of saving obligation principles see Bertoldi (2008) 
4 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Financing paths of Efficiency Obligations 
For energy efficiency obligations five parties have to be considered, namely investors 
themselves, the energy customers, the obligated parties and a supervising authority. The 
fifth actor is the commercial banks, which contribute to the financing of the investment. 
Normally, the obligated party supports the investors by some sort of subsidy to initiate 
the investment. For the administration of the efficiency scheme, they may have to pay 
some administrative fees. They refinance themselves through energy prices (or reduced 
profit) (Schlomann 2013). 
Thus, the costs are finally allocated to the energy customers, who normally will pay 
according to their energy use giving the system a sort of polluter-pays principle. Never-
theless, the energy customers who profit most from the subsidies are not necessarily the 
ones who pay the final bill, as only those who receive the subsidies profit from lower 
energy costs. For the obligated parties, it may be easier and cheaper to spend their mon-
ey on groups with better equity (Rosenow et al. 2013). This could increase leverage, for 
the need for subsidies is lower than in groups with more difficult access to capital (see 
section 4.1).  To face these issues, ESOs in France and the UK incorporate a social 
component to ensure that some of the investments are made in deprived groups. 
To illustrate the specific mechanism of obligation schemes, the contrasting example of a 
classical funding scheme is shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 2: Financing paths of funding schemes 
Within a tax based funding scheme the situation is different from an efficiency obliga-
tion. Instead of an obligated party, a funding body grants the subsidies, using capital 
provided by the state, which refinances itself via taxes. The funding body – like the ob-
ligated party in the case of efficiency obligations – initiates the investment by granting 
some form of subsidy. 
The costs of the subsidies are finally borne by taxpayers, making it more like an ability-
to-pay system. The funding body does not necessarily follow a logic of delivering the 
most (short-term) savings for their investment, but may follow a more long term in-
vestment strategy, making the system less cost-effective on the short term. It may also 
consider social issues in program design. 
Cost allocation is an important issue to discuss when looking at leverage. The main dif-
ference between the schemes in terms of cost allocation is the endpoint of the allocation 
chain. Within a saving obligation it is the energy consumer, within the (tax based) fund-
ing scheme it is the taxpayer. The social and political implications of this potential bur-
den to energy customers or tax payers require responsible use of the funds and thus 
should be a motivation to increase leverage. 
 
3. DEFINING LEVERAGE 
In this paper we assume leverage means delivering more investment in energy efficien-
cy by multiplying the finance available from policy induced third party funding sources 
(subsequently called “public funding”, including Government funding through tax reve-
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nues and consumer-funded expenditure such as ESOs and public benefits charges)2. 
Regardless of the instrument chosen, most financing mechanisms rely on the consumer 
or taxpayer as the one who finally pays for the implementation of the energy efficiency 
measures. As these are all constrained resources, optimal use of the money should be 
secured. 
It is important to appreciate the different types of leverage with regard to energy effi-
ciency programmes as they use different sources of finance and result in potentially 
different degrees of leverage. The following four types of leverage are most prominent 
for energy efficiency measures. Options 1-3 fall into the category of continuous support 
of measures whereas option 4 only provides funding over a short time period assuming 
this is sufficient to stimulate the market sufficiently.  
 
1. Using public sources to part-fund a project, e.g. 50% consumer-funded grant 
typical in past ESOs in the UK, but also in some Clean Development Mecha-
nism (CDM) funded projects. The remaining proportion of the investment is 
provided by the beneficiaries themselves. 
2. Using public funds to reduce or remove loan interest rates, e.g. CO2-
Building Rehabilitation Programme in Germany.  The Property Assessed Clean 
Energy (PACE) mechanism in the US also fits into this category, but uses prop-
erty tax reductions rather than direct support. The cost of the investment is en-
tirely covered by the beneficiaries. 
3. Using public funds to grant tax breaks, e.g. reduced VAT rate on some prod-
ucts and income tax reductions as in France and Italy. The tax breaks provided 
constitute a subsidy toward the overall investment costs. 
4. Using public funds to kick-start markets, which then become self-sustaining 
(or at least sustaining at lower rates of support).  This could be as support for 
specific new technologies (e.g. the 100,000 roof programme in Germany sup-
porting solar power) or in support for new business models (such as the Green 
Deal in the UK).  In both cases this requires a dynamic economic analysis in 
contrast to the other types which are essentially static. 
                                                 
 
2We exclude policy instruments like product regulation that require private investment 
with no matching public money. 
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The additional investment levered is typically provided by the direct beneficiary of the 
project – usually the building owner and/or occupant, but in principle from other 
sources as well.  For type 2 of the above list, this would generally be banks and other 
lenders, but this then usually requires the primary beneficiary to repay the loan and any 
reduced rate interest. For type 1, third parties may include municipalities or social hous-
ing providers who part-subsidise energy efficiency measures in order to reach a larger 
number of participants. 
In order to measure leverage we define a leverage factor that is capable of representing 
the degree of leverage achieved by a given energy efficiency programme. For the pur-
pose of this paper, we measure leverage in form of a leverage factor defined as: 
 
L = leverage factor 
CO = contribution from obligated party to total investment cost 
CB = contribution from beneficiary to total investment cost 
CT = contributions from any third parties to total investment cost 
Ia = other incentives such as tax credits 
It follows that leverage is zero for a leverage factor value of 1.0. A leverage factor of 
2.0, for example, suggests that contributions from the obligated party were matched 
with 100% funding from the beneficiary and third parties. 
Our computation of leverage factors is based on the cost estimates available for the dif-
ferent countries: Lees (2008, 2006) for the UK; Giraudet et al. (2012) for France; Toge-
by (2012) for Denmark. The methodology used to derive these estimates is similar 
across countries. 
Regarding how much beneficiaries spend on a given measure, Lees (2006), Togeby 
(2012) and Giraudet et al. (2012) only take into account the share of investment that is 
additional to what would have occurred in absence of the obligation. For instance, the 
full cost of insulation is considered, while only the cost differential between an efficient 
boiler and a standard one is considered. 
Regarding additionality i.e., how many beneficiaries are induced by the obligation, Lees 
makes the assumption that 20% of the beneficiaries would have invested anyway in the 
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absence of the scheme. The figures he provides are net from any free-rider effects. Dif-
ferently, the figures provided by Giraudet et al. (2012) assume full additionality of the 
obligation, as no assessment of free-rider effects could be performed. In Denmark, 
Bundgaard et al. (2013) assume a rather low additionality of less than 10% for measures 
in households (i.e. 90% free-riders), but an additionality of more than 50% in industry, 
which is the main focus of investment in Denmark.  
Lastly, Lees (2006) and Giraudet et al. (2012) estimated the indirect cost borne by obli-
gated parties for tasks induced by the obligation, such as marketing or development. 
These costs are not taken into account in the present study. Rather, the analysis focuses 
on direct costs, which constitute the main share of the overall costs. For the beneficiar-
ies, the indirect costs are invisible and not relevant in terms of the economics of indi-
vidual investments in energy efficiency improvements. Using this definition of the lev-
erage factor has the benefit of showing the relative contribution to investments in ener-
gy efficiency measures required in order to mobilise private and/or third party capital. It 
does not, however, account for the total cost such as administration costs and search 
costs for example. While these costs are not insignificant, estimates for the British 
scheme show that they are only a small fraction of the total cost (Lees 2008, 2006). 
Further limitations of our definition of the leverage factor include the inability to ac-
count for non-finance measures such as informational measures that indirectly stimulate 
the uptake of energy efficiency measures. Further research could develop more sophisti-
cated computations of leverage factors that include such programmes as well.  
 
4. CHARACTERISTICS OF ENERGY SAVINGS OBLIGATIONS 
The general concept of an energy saving obligation is to oblige a party to deliver a de-
fined amount of energy savings within a certain time. Those parties are usually final 
energy suppliers or the distribution network operators, which is the case in all the Euro-
pean systems. But also independent entities can act as the obligated party. For example, 
the ESO in Vermont is designed in such a way, which resembles very much an energy 
efficiency funds with a fixed saving target and variable budget. 
The energy saving measures that may be undertaken by the obligated parties or other 
actors have to be monitored. This is usually done by standard saving scores (also known 
as deemed savings), which rely on engineering estimates often corrected by direct 
measurements within a representative sample. 
ESOs include a trading mechanism, which allows obligated parties and/or other  ac-
tors to trade certified savings. If traded in an open market, a price for energy savings 
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will be determined and obligated parties can decide to invest in energy savings them-
selves or buy (white) certificates from other actors. 
To secure additionality, the baseline may be set according to existing regulations and 
policy instruments already in place. Some systems employ a different approach by de-
liberately allowing an overlap with existing instruments. The main intention of such a 
system is then to secure a certain level of energy savings and to promote existing in-
struments to maximise leverage.  
We now proceed with a brief overview of the three ESOs discussed in this paper. 
4.1 The design of Energy Savings Obligations in the UK 
In the UK the ESOs are the most important instrument to deliver energy and carbon 
savings in the domestic sector (OFGEM, 2005) and both the 2004 and 2007 Energy 
Efficiency Action Plans highlight ESOs as the principal policy mechanism to deliver 
energy savings in the domestic sector (2004, 2007). The basic concept of ESOs in Brit-
ain is that Government imposes an energy savings target on large energy suppliers (gas 
and electricity) that has to be achieved at the customer end, which may relate to energy 
consumption or carbon emissions. Businesses and industrial end-users are not covered 
by the scheme; they are targeted by other policy instruments such as the Climate 
Change Levy and Climate Change Agreements, as well as the recently introduced Car-
bon Reduction Commitment. 
The first ESOs in Britain were introduced in 1994. We focus on the Energy Efficiency 
Commitment (EEC) 1 and 2. EEC 1 was in place from 2002 to 2005 and EEC 2 from 
2005 to 2008. EEC was eventually renamed in 2008 to the Carbon Emissions Reduction 
Target (CERT) that ran from 2008 to 2012. 
A distinct feature of the British scheme is the specific targeting of a priority group (PG) 
in the scheme, which focuses on households in receipt of specified state benefits and 
elderly residents. 
In Britain, energy suppliers comply with their obligations by subsidising energy effi-
cient technologies. There were various routes the energy suppliers used including 
(Rosenow 2012):  
 Subsidise installers of insulation: Energy suppliers contracted installers or deliv-
ery agents who contract installers of energy saving measures (for example cavity 
wall insulation) that carry out the work in homes. 
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 Subsidise products sold via retail: Suppliers have subsidised energy efficient 
products (for example insulation material) sold via ‘do it yourself’ (DIY) mar-
kets and other retailers.   Subsidise products sent via mail: Energy companies subsidised certain products, 
and, for example, promoted the use of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) via 
mass mail-outs of free light bulbs, although this is now prohibited. 
4.2 The design of Energy Savings Obligations in France 
In France, the first obligation period ran from 2006 to 2009. The second obligation pe-
riod has been running since 2011 and will last until 2013. All energy suppliers above a 
certain sales threshold are subject to the obligation. Within the second obligation period, 
also the gasoline suppliers are among the obligated parties. Differing from the UK sav-
ing obligation, the French system covers all energy demand sectors, with eligible 
measures also in the transport sector.  
Unlike in the UK, obligated parties in France do not systematically subsidise energy 
efficient technologies. They use a broader set of compliance strategies, including: 
• Free energy audits and advice: these services are provided for the most part by con-
tracted installers. They are also provided directly by the obligated parties via their call 
centres or websites.  
• Direct subsidies: they tend to target specifically boilers and other measures on heat-
ing systems. They are by and large the main compliance strategy used by fuel oil sup-
pliers. In contrast, they are little used by electricity suppliers. Department stores whose 
gasoline sales are covered by the obligation offer some vouchers for free purchases to 
customers who buy energy efficient products in their stores. 
• Soft loans: Some major obligated parties have their own banks as subsidiaries and 
use them to offer reduced interest rate loans to consumers. 
The French scheme does not exclude overlap with other instruments, so the investors 
usually combine the subsidies from the saving obligation with various incentives grant-
ed for efficiency products. This includes: 
• Income tax reliefs for energy efficient products: This policy was implemented in 
2005. All the energy efficient products covered are also eligible within the energy sav-
ing obligation.  
• Zero interest rate loans granted by private banks on behalf of the Government: This 
policy was implemented in 2009. All the energy efficient products covered are also eli-
gible to the energy saving obligation. However, the overlap between the two instru-
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ments is limited by the fact that soft loans can only be granted if several measures are 
combined, e.g., wall insulation together with an upgrade of the heating system. 
4.3 The design of Energy Savings Obligations in Denmark 
The Danish ESOs are considered very ambitious, even complying with the 1.5 % target 
of article 7 of the EED without major system changes. The Danish obligation is set on 
the distribution companies rather then energy suppliers. The target is set in a coopera-
tive process between the obligated parties and the ministry.  
The distribution companies implement their measures together with energy service 
companies and other actors like energy performance contractors to comply with the ob-
ligation.  
For the accounting process deemed savings as well as individual assessments are possi-
ble depending on the type of measure. Measures from all sectors excluding transport are 
eligible for the ESOs. The accounting methodology of the savings in the Danish scheme 
is different from the British and French approach, which uses (discounted) lifetime sav-
ings. In Denmark, only the first year savings are taken into account. Some uplift factors 
are used to account for the different lifetimes of the measures. Nevertheless, the ac-
counting methodology favours measures with shorter lifetimes. 
An overlap of the scheme with other instruments is explicitly part of the design. Most of 
the measures are implemented in enterprises from the industrial and services sector – 
the French and British ESOs focus mainly on domestic customers. In 2011 the share of 
savings delivered by enterprises was larger than 60 percent.  
 
5. LEVERAGE – RESULTS FROM ENERGY SAVINGS OBLIGATION 
IN EUROPE 
5.1 The example of the UK 
The different routes entail varying degrees of subsidy and contributions from the recipi-
ents themselves. Detailed figures exist for the obligation periods 2002-2005 and 2005-
2008. The following tables show the contributions for various measures and delivery 
routes made by energy suppliers, households, and third parties such as Local Authorities 
or Social Housing Providers. The leverage factors are provided as well (1.0 meaning no 
leverage i.e. 100% subsidy by supplier and 2.0 representing 50% contribution from the 
energy supplier and 50% from recipients and third parties). Note that the contribution is 
paid to the total cost of the investment and the percentages refer to the total direct cost 
excluding the administration costs.  
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Table 1: Leverage during EEC 1 2002-05 
Delivery route and 
promoted measure Subsidy 
Contribution 
from recipient 
Contribution 
from 3rd party Leverage factor 
Subsidise installers of insulation 
Cavity wall insula-
tion      
   Able to Pay Cus-
tomers (ATP) 47% 44% 10% 2.2 
   Priority Group 
(PG)3 76% 6% 18% 1.3 
Loft insulation (top 
up)     
   ATP 46% 29% 25% 2.2 
   PG 62% 4% 33% 1.6 
Loft insulation 
(virgin)      
   ATP 50% 42% 8% 2.0 
   PG 87% 2% 11% 1.2 
Subsidise products sold via retail 
DIY loft insulation     
   ATP 36% 64% 0% 2.8 
   PG 34% 67% 0% 3.0 
CFLs 
   PG 39% 57% 5% 2.6 
   ATP 37% 59% 4% 2.7 
Subsidise products sent via mail 
CFLs     
   ATP 81% 17% 2% 1.2 
                                                 
 
3
  The priority group covers households in receipt of specified state benefits or with elderly residents. 
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   PG 98% 1% 1% 1.0 
TOTAL     
   ATP 44% 44% 12% 2.3 
   PG 65% 9% 26% 1.5 
Source: own calculations based on Lees (2006) 
Overall, leverage during EEC 1 (2002-2005) was about 1.9, i.e. for every euro spent by 
suppliers almost one euro was contributed by recipients and third parties with a larger 
share coming from recipients. Leverage was higher for ATP measures (2.3) compared to 
PG measures (1.5), but PG measures attracted more than twice as much third party fi-
nance. The highest leverage was achieved in retail schemes with leverage factors of up 
to 3.0. This was followed by subsidies to the installation of insulation showing leverage 
factors of up to 2.2. The lowest leverage factor was achieved in products sent via mail to 
households, mainly a result of distributing CFLs free of charge. 
Table 2: Leverage during EEC 2 2005-08 
Delivery route and 
promoted measure 
Subsidy Contribution 
from recipient 
Contribution 
from 3rd party 
Leverage factor 
Subsidise installers of insulation 
Cavity wall insula-
tion  
    
   ATP 60% 37% 3% 1.7 
   PG 92% 0% 7% 1.1 
Loft insulation (top 
up) 
    
   ATP 50% 41% 9% 2.0 
   PG 80% 3% 17% 1.3 
Loft insulation 
(virgin)  
    
   ATP 65% 31% 4% 1.5 
   PG 93% 0% 7% 1.1 
Subsidise products sold via retail 
DIY loft insulation     
   ATP 30% 70% 0% 3.3 
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   PG 30% 70% 0% 3.3 
CFLs 
   PG 39% 61% 0% 2.6 
   ATP 45% 55% 0% 2.2 
Subsidise products sent via mail 
CFLs     
   ATP 99% 1% 0% 1.0 
   PG 100% 0% 0% 1.0 
TOTAL     
   ATP 54% 39% 7% 1.9 
   PG 86% 2% 12% 1.2 
Source: own calculations based on Lees (2008) 
During EEC 2 (2005-2008), leverage was just half of what it was during EEC 1 (1.44 
compared to 1.87), i.e. for every euro spent by suppliers 44 cents were contributed by 
recipients and third parties. However, leverage was higher in retail schemes than during 
EEC 1. The overall picture is similar to EEC 1 with highest leverage achieved in retail 
schemes and lowest in mail outs. 
Note that the figures presented are direct cost contributions to the measures promoted 
and they do not include any indirect cost to the parties involved. 
At the time of writing, no data on CERT (2008-2012) was available. However, it is 
clear that in the last phase of CERT leverage for schemes subsidising insulation has 
declined and was even below 1.0 at the end of the scheme for some measures. This is 
where energy suppliers paid households the full cost of the measure plus an additional 
incentive. 
As we discuss later in chapter 4, the cost allocation is important for the social ac-
ceptance of the instrument. Consumer groups with a rather low willingness to pay are 
less likely to be targeted by the obligated party if no specific provisions are included in 
the instrument. Therefore, in addition to the existing Priority Group, a Super-Priority 
Group (SPG) target was introduced in March 2011 as a sub-target within CERT. CERT 
originally required suppliers to deliver 40% of the targeted emission savings with 
households deemed to be in the ‘priority group’ (PG), which focused on people who are 
above 70 years old or receive certain benefits (DECC 2010). The SPG target required 
suppliers to meet 37.5 % of their PG target (15% of their total CERT target) by deliver-
15 
 
 
ing measures to a subset of households that were considered to be at high risk of fuel 
poverty. The SPG differed from the PG because of stricter eligibility requirements re-
garding recipient’s household income and the benefits they receive.  
Most suppliers struggled to achieve their SPG targets and because of this some failed to 
achieve their overall CERT targets within the obligation period, which ended in De-
cember 2012. This was the first time that a major supplier has failed to deliver on their 
obligations. OFGEM granted suppliers an extension period until 31 January to deliver 
their obligations (OFGEM 2012a). At the end of CERT, suppliers offered incentives for 
SPG recipients including vouchers toward their fuel bill and cash back schemes. Some 
suppliers also incentivised referrals by granting those who successfully referred a SPG 
household a lump sum. Because non-retail schemes for SPG households were fully 
funded in the last phase of CERT, suppliers were paying 100% + x% incentives result-
ing in a leverage factor of <1.0, i.e. for every euro suppliers spend they have to spend 
extra in order to achieve the required uptake. 
Similar issues occur with insulation for non-SPG households: As part of the CERT ex-
tension in 2011 and for the first time since the inception of the ESO, Government de-
cided to set a minimum share for insulation measures. Subsequently, suppliers were 
required to achieve 68% of the target under CERT by investing in insulation measures 
(DECC, 2010). Suppliers were also struggling to meet a target specifying they must 
achieve at least 68% of their carbon target from March 2011 to January 2013 via insula-
tion measures (DECC, 2010). In June 2012, suppliers had achieved about 65% of their 
obligation, leaving 35% for the last 6 months. Energy suppliers offered free insulation 
to everyone, regardless of whether they were in the able-to-pay group the or PG. Hence, 
leverage for non-retail insulation can be assumed to be zero (i.e. leverage factor of 1.0) 
for the last phase of CERT. 
The above shows that if the targets get tighter, leverage decreases because suppliers find 
it more difficult to achieve their obligations without fully subsidising the measures. 
Contributing factors are decreasing potentials for the various measures meaning that 
fewer opportunities exist leading to more intense competition and more attractive offers 
with lower leverage. As ESOs in Britain moved towards high cost measures mainly 
post-2012 (Rosenow and Eyre 2013), the issue of leverage becomes more and more 
important: Will households be willing to make a contribution to costly measures? If not, 
the cost for suppliers, which will be passed on to all customers, is going to increase. 
There is anecdotal evidence that customers are much less willing to make contributions 
to the high-cost measures leading to lower leverage factors. 
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5.2 Overlap of instruments – The example of France 
The French ESO is Europe’s system with the broadest range of eligible measures. Still, 
the measures adopted in practice are only a few. During the first period, the installation 
of efficient boilers was the most prominent among them, accounting for more than half 
of the measures. Insulation measures were the second largest contributor in terms of 
energy savings, making the building domain the primary area that received measures as 
part of the ESOs. This breakdown has not changed much in the second period. As of 
April 2013, the share of boilers was 35% and insulation was 15% (DGEC 2013). 
In the second period, residential buildings still represent 81% of the total energy sav-
ings. Compared to the other eligible sectors, residential buildings is the most cost-
effective potential for energy savings. This is why, for instance, gasoline suppliers pri-
marily rely on the building sector to generate energy savings, instead of focusing on the 
transportation sector. Yet within the residential sector, Giraudet et al. (2011) have found 
that the measures taken in the first period were not necessarily the cheapest. In a com-
petitive market, one would expect the obligated parties to address the most cost-
effective measures first, assuming that the required contribution is smaller compared to 
high-cost measures. This is the point where the interaction of the saving obligation 
scheme with other measures becomes important. Most prominent among them4 is the 
tax credit scheme, which interacts closely with the saving obligation. During the first 
period of the obligation, the tax cuts granted by the tax credit scheme tended to be high-
er for measures on the heating system than for measures on the insulation, despite the 
fact that the latter tend to be more cost-effective.  
Using cost figures estimated by Giraudet et al. (2012), leverage for the efficiency 
measures – set in relation to the additional cost of efficiency measures compared to the 
baseline, which is directly comparable to estimates found for the UK – was 1.37 in the 
first period. About 65 % of the additional investment was covered by the tax credit. 
Considering the overall investment, the tax credits still coverednearly 35% of the total 
costs. Compared to these values, the direct contribution of the obligated parties to fi-
nancing is rather limited. In relation to the additional investment, the obligated parties 
                                                 
 
4No data is available yet about the interaction between the obligation and the soft loan scheme, which 
was only implemented in 2009. 
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only contribute 4 % of the investments costs5. In relation to the total investment, this 
amount is even lower, accounting for 2 % only. 
Table 3: Leverage within the French obligation Scheme 
    Obligated 
party's cost 
Investor's direct 
costs 
Tax Credit Cost Sum Leverage 
Factor 
Full Costs M€ 74 2341 1305 
3720  
Additional Costs 504 
1883  
Full Costs % 2% 63% 35% 100%                2.70  
Additional Costs 4% 27% 69% 100%                1.37  
Source: own calculations based on Giraudet et al. (2012) 
These figures show that the (direct) leverage effect of the saving obligation scheme is 
rather low, at least compared to what is observed in the UK. The obligated parties’ con-
tribution to the financing is rather low, compared to the costs borne by the other actors. 
Therefore the allocation of the leverage effect to the saving obligation scheme is ques-
tionable, for the main financial contribution comes from the tax credit scheme. Never-
theless, before the system was introduced, the demand for the tax credits was rather low 
and was heavily stimulated by the promotion of the obligated parties. Therefore the sav-
ing obligation scheme plays an important part in addressing the barriers, which are not 
only financial. 
In the second period, preliminary analysis by ADEME (2013) found that overlap with 
the tax credit scheme has receded from nearly 100% to only 50%. At the same time, the 
amount of subsidies offered by obligated parties does not seem to have increased. This 
is reflected by the fact that the price of white certificates on the trading platform 
(www.emmy.fr) has been flat and confined between .325c€/kWh to .425c€/kWh over 
the course of the second period. This price proved to be an accurate proxy for the costs 
borne by obligated parties in the evaluation of the first period. This suggests that obli-
gated parties have not yet moved towards high-cost energy saving potentials. 
                                                 
 
5Direct costs represent only 35% of the total costs incurred by obligated parties in France. In contrast, 
this share is 85% in the UK. 
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As a result of the lower contribution from the tax credit and the constant contribution 
from the obliged parties, the leverage factor should increase in the second period. This 
increase should however be temporary and followed by a decrease in the longer run, as 
obligated parties will need to tap harder-to-reach potentials in the future. 
Lastly, analysis by ADEME suggests that advice and other information services offered 
by obligated parties provide consumers with much satisfaction. This suggests that the 
obligation is effective at inducing the obligated parties to address the information gap. 
5.3 Denmark 
As described in paragraph 3.4 the Danish obligation scheme is – while comparable to 
the French scheme in terms of scope – quite different in the actual mix of implemented 
measures. It is the only European scheme with a substantial share of measures undertak-
en in the commercial and industrial sector, rather than having a strong focus on domes-
tic buildings. The Italian scheme has changed in that direction over the last few years, 
but data on that scheme is hard to access in an international context. Because these two 
groups are quite different in their economic behaviour, they are treated separately in the 
following considerations. 
Table 3 gives an overview of the triggered investments within the Danish obligation 
scheme.  
  Obligated 
party's cost 
Investor's 
direct costs 
Obligated 
party's cost 
Investor's 
direct costs 
Leverage 
Factor  
  DKK/kWh     
Enterprises 0,4 0,8 33% 67% 3 
Households 0,4 9,6 4% 96% 25 
Average 0,4 2,8 13% 88% 8 
Source: own calculations based on Togeby (2012) 
In enterprises the leverage is rather low compared to the household sector, still the addi-
tional investment is rather high compared to the figures from France and UK. For 
households (where the main measures are deep renovation and boiler change) the lever-
age factor is very high compared to the other figures, so with very low capital invest-
ment by the obligated party large investments are triggered. About 10 percent of the 
measures are triggered without any subsidy, but by energy advice only. 
However, additionality seems to be an important issue within the Danish obligation 
scheme. Bundgaard (2013) showed in an evaluation of the scheme, that in households 
only a minority (<10 %) of the implemented measures are additional. The scheme then 
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acts as a tool for measurement and verification of energy saving measures undertaken 
anyhow, but does not lead to significant additional investments. In contrast, capital go-
ing into such measures may even be withdrawn from more important investment oppor-
tunities. Therefore the high leverage factors of the Danish scheme have to be handled 
with care.  
Country synthesis 
The important question arising from the presented findings is what factors make the 
situation in Denmark so different from the British and French situation. The answer 
mainly lies in the different system designs. Although the general design of the efficien-
cy obligations is very similar in the three countries, some features make a major differ-
ence. 
The sheer number of measures carried out in the UK6 shows that the measures are not 
undertaken in the regular maintenance cycle. For those out of schedule measures, the 
financial barrier is much more relevant than in case of regular maintenance where only 
the additional costs of the efficiency measure are relevant for the barriers because the 
investor/consumer has already decided to do something. 
Investment within the regular maintenance cycle applies to the Danish scheme, and 
therefore the subsidy levels are considerably lower.  Thus the leverage effect is much 
larger than in the UK and France. Within the French scheme there are large windfall 
gains, due to tax credits for installation of measures that may not be additional.  This is 
nevertheless intended in the system design. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The required investment in energy efficiency is substantial if the multiple benefits of 
energy demand reduction are to be realised. However, government budgets are becom-
ing increasingly constrained by austerity measures, making it increasingly difficult to 
provide the funds needed to finance energy efficiency. Equally, rising energy prices and 
the reluctance of regulators to add further cost to energy bills limit the ability of ESOs 
paid for by energy consumers to provide sufficient funding for energy efficiency. Better 
                                                 
 
6
 The CERT Update gives a number of nearly 2.5 million wall insulation measures and 3.5 million 
loft insulation measures, which covers about 20 % of the British building stock 
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leverage of public funding, whether provided in the form of grants (paid for by the ex-
chequer) or through ESOs (paid for by energy consumers), is therefore essential. 
We argued that ESOs have traditionally been seen as an instrument with a high leverage 
effect i.e. stimulating investments over and above the funds collected through energy 
bills from both private investors and other public bodies. However, so far there is no 
systematic analysis of the ability of ESOs to lever in private and public capital.  
As a first step, we defined a leverage factor which can be used to appraise the degree of 
leverage of ESOs (and potentially other policy instruments). This leverage factor takes 
into account the amount of public funds provided, the additional private and public 
capital levered, but also situations where funding from ESOs is blended with further 
incentives (for example tax rebates). We applied this leverage factor to three prominent 
ESOs, namely the UK, France and Denmark. Our analysis suggests a wide range of lev-
erage across ESOs and types of energy efficiency measures supported. This spread can 
largely be explained by the different design features of ESOs and the degree to which 
the measures supported are additional. In general we found that the higher the leverage 
factor, the lower the additionality of implemented actions.  
ESOs in the UK historically focused on a large number of relatively simple measures 
that are in most cases not undertaken as part of the regular maintenance cycle requiring 
a higher contribution in the form of public funds. Furthermore, the UK system has a 
strong emphasis of social equity, allocating a large proportion of the activity to vulnera-
ble households often on low incomes who cannot make substantial financial contribu-
tions. This leads to a lower leverage effect compared to a scheme that focuses entirely 
on the able-to-pay. The French ESOs display very similar leverage factors as the UK 
after the effect of tax rebates is taken into account. Without deducting the effect of tax 
rebates the French system would show a much higher leverage effect. ESOs in Denmark 
show high leverage factors, particularly in the household sector. However, there is con-
siderable doubt regarding the additionality of some of the measures and further research 
is required to unravel the dynamics of the Danish scheme. 
Future research should focus on how the trade-off between leverage and additionality 
can be minimised. More sophisticated methods to incorporate the degree of additionali-
ty into the leverage factor would allow for a systematic analysis of policy instruments 
showing the cost and leverage effect for additional energy savings which would be a 
more appropriate comparator. 
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